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Quality of Government: What You Get 
 
 
or more than a decade, international organizations such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations have emphasized the importance of good 
governance and sound institutions from a development perspective. The theory 
behind this is that only with a high quality of government (henceforth QoG), 
can a country reap the benefits of economic growth and social development. In 
this article we present a review of this research together with a first basic 
benchmark empirical analysis of the bivariate relationships between three 
widely used measures of QoG and twenty-two different measures of important 
societal outcomes in five areas: health, environmental sustainability, economy, 
social policy and life satisfaction.1 In the empirical analysis, we employ data 
from the Quality of Government Institute’s data bank.2 Our central question is 
simple and straightforward: Does QoG matter? 
F 
      
The 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration identifies good governance as 
a necessary requirement for countries to foster economic development and 
reduce poverty.3 Similarly, the 2002 U.N. Human Development Report singles 
out democracy as a particularly important feature of good governance. It states 
that: “For politics and political institutions to promote human development and 
safeguard the freedom and dignity of all people, democracy must widen and 
deepen.”4 However, the report also warns that: “The links between democracy 
and human development are not automatic: when a small elite dominates 
economic and political decisions, the link between democracy and equity can be 
broken”.5 This warning was later expanded in the 2003 U.N. Human 
                                                 
1 We thank Marcus Samanni at the QoG Institute for assistance with collecting and analyzing 
the data. 
2 Teorell, Jan, Sören Holmberg & Bo Rothstein. 2008. The Quality of Government Dataset, 
version 15 May 08. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
3 United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) para. 13 
4 Human Development Report 2002, p. 1 
5 Ibid. p. 3 
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Development Report. Although still championing good governance and the 
importance of democratic institutions, the 2003 Report states that reforms in this 
area on their own are not sufficient for fostering economic growth and equitable 
development.6 A closer look at data from the Human Development Index (HDI) 
shows that in the 1990s, a time of democratization and reform, twenty-one 
countries saw a fall in their HDI ranking (measuring health, education, 
standards of living). This can be compared with the 1980s, before the big push 
for good governance had begun, when only four countries saw their HDI 
ranking decline.7. 
  
The complex conceptual and empirical relation between QoG and economic and 
social development is manifest in discussions about whether the effects of good 
governance in fact are as important as has been stated by the international policy 
community. Critics have claimed that the benefits of good governance have 
been over-stated. The lack of objective data and the absence of a universal 
definition for “good governance” mean that empirical results in different studies 
support both sides of the debate. For example, while some studies show that a 
high QoG leads to greater income inequality (Lopez 2004), other studies show 
the reverse (Gupta, Davoodi, Alonso-Terme 2002). The differences in these 
results stem partly from the authors measuring different aspects of good 
governance. Whilst the first study uses the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) index as a measure of its governance variable, the latter study uses six 
different indices of corruption (of which one is the ICRG index). Thus, because 
“good governance” is such a broad concept and encompasses a range of issues, 
empirical analyses hinge greatly on the definition of the term. 
 
This article therefore begins with a review of the conceptual discussion of what 
Quality of Government means. This is then followed in Section II by discussions 
on four big debates within the field of good governance; these are the 
                                                 
6 Human Development Report 2003, p. 76 
7 Years of plenty? Economist, 7/12/2003, Vol. 368, Issue 8332 
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Democracy-, Economic Growth-, Corruption- and the Rule of Law debates. 
Section III uses the insights from the preceding section to focus on the policy 
outcomes of QoG in the fields of social well-being, public health, and 
environmental sustainability. In addition to the review of previous studies on 
these topics, our own empirical analysis is presented. Finally, Section IV 
concludes with a discussion about future research on QoG. 
 
 
What is Quality of Government? 
 
The most frequently used definition of “quality of government” rests on the 
World Bank’s notion of governance. It is defined broadly as: 
 
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments, are 
selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, 
and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.8 
 
The World Bank’s Governance Database compiles a large range of governance 
data to provide a measurement of the different aspects of governance according 
to their definition. These categories include “voice and accountability”, 
“political instability and violence”, “government effectiveness”, “regulatory 
quality”, “rule of law” and “control of corruption”. These different 
measurements are used in a large number of studies. Some studies focus on one 
of these categories while others emphasize using all of the different dimensions.  
 
However, one criticism of the World Bank’s Governance Database is that the 
data is largely based on perceptions and thus lacks objectivity. This leaves the 
possibility that countries are rated according to prejudiced or deterministic ideas 
of how a country should perform. As a consequence, some scholars argue that 
                                                 
8 Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobatón (1999) p. 1 
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QoG should be defined according to a set of objective outcomes. Robert 
Rotberg, for example, states that a country’s QoG should be rated based on such 
measures as literacy levels, school persistence rates, medical services, state of 
law and order, and civil society empowerment.9 However, such an approach 
runs the risk of equating good governance with anything that produces good 
outcomes. In this case QoG becomes so broad that it amounts to a tautology, 
thus rendering it unworkable.10 On the other hand, this approach may identify 
certain traits of good governance that are not factored into the World Bank’s 
more narrow definition. One such trait may, for example, be a measurement of 
“social cohesion”, defined by Easterly, Ritzan and Woolcock as “the nature and 
extent of social and economic divisions within society”11. However, as Anna 
Persson has shown, social cohesion may be a (very important) result of QoG 
and should in that case not be a part of the definition.12 Another problem with 
the World Bank’s definition is that it includes too much and is in practice 
identical with liberal democracy. As Rothstein & Teorell have argued, it does 
not distinguish between the “access to power” and the “exercise of power” and 
it also lacks a “basic norm” from which its many different parts can be 
deduced.13     
 
Thus, in general terms, because researchers and practitioners have not yet 
arrived at a standard definition of what good governance (or QoG) is,14 different 
studies adopt different interpretations, generating a risk that researchers will 
employ definitions that best serve to confirm their theory. For instance, studies 
that show a link between good governance and economic growth may 
emphasize “regulatory quality” over other aspects of QoG.15 Therefore, when 
evaluating studies on the “real world” effects of QoG, it is important to keep in 
mind which approach to good governance that is in focus.  
                                                 
9 Rotberg (2007) p. 154 
10 Rothstein and Teorell (2008) 
11 Easterly, Ritzan and Woolcock (2006) p. 4 
12 Persson (2008) 
13 Rothstein and Teorell (2008) 
14 Ibid. 
15 Roy (2005)  
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 However, the measurement problem may not be as difficult as the discussion 
above indicates. As shown in table 1, three widely used indexes of QoG 
correlate at the 0.90 level. These three indexes are the World Bank’s 
“Government Effectiveness Index”, Transparency International’s “Corruption 
Perceptions Index” and the “Rule of Law Index” also from the World Bank. For 
a few countries there are interesting differences, but the general impression is 
that these variables closely go “hand in hand”. 
 
QoG and the Democracy Debate 
 
Several studies show a link between civil liberties and democracy on the one 
hand, and better development outcomes on the other (Halperin et al 2005). For 
example, a World Bank study concludes that the greater civil liberties a country 
has, the larger is the success rate of implementation of government investment 
projects financed by the Bank. The authors thus argue that the suppression of 
civil liberties is likely to have adverse consequences for government 
performance.16 Similarly, Li et al. (1998) find that civil liberties are positively 
related to higher incomes for the poor and the rich, as well as decreases in 
inequality. Chong and Gradstein (2004) also find that civil liberties and political 
freedoms have a negative correlation with the Gini coefficient, meaning that 
civil liberties and political freedoms are positively related to equality. Another 
study which shows the importance of giving citizens a voice states that “those 
who know how to report corruption are significantly less likely to have to pay a 
bribe, to be more satisfied with service delivery, and to perceive greater 
improvements in education and health over time”.17 It is thus argued that citizen 
empowerment is the key to creating effective institutions. Cheung and Leung 
(2006) similarly show a positive link between government accountability and 
life satisfaction. Thus, civil liberties and democracy are often championed as the 
                                                 
16 Ibid. p. 237 
17 Deininger and Mpuga (2004) p. 183 
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antidote to everything from corruption to poverty. This is because the two are 
linked to accountability, which helps to reduce the discretionary powers of 
public officials.18 Or to use Hirschman’s phrase, “while markets create 
managerial discipline and induce efficacy through the exercise of choice, 
governments are principally disciplined through the exercise of voice”.19  
The problem is that empirically, there is no straightforward relationship between 
electoral representative democracy and QoG in the exercise of public power. On 
the contrary, democracy seems to be curvilinearly related to the level of 
corruption (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Sung 2004). Empirical research 
indicates that some democratization may at times be worse than none for certain 
aspects of QoG. For example, some of the worst cases of corruption have 
appeared in newly democratized countries, such as Peru under its former 
president Fujimori (McMillan and Zoido 2004). 
 
The problem that electoral democracy does not necessarily lead to increased 
quality of government was taken up at a conference held in 2007 celebrating the 
establishment twenty-five years earlier of the U.S. based National Endowment 
for Democracy. At this conference, where the spectacular success of 
democratization over the world was lauded, Larry Diamond, one of the most 
prominent scholars in the field of democratization studies, stated that: 
 
There is a specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is 
bad governance—governance that serves only the interests of a 
narrow ruling elite. Governance that is drenched in corruption, 
patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power. Governance that is 
not responding to the massive and long-deferred social agenda of 
reducing inequality and unemployment and fighting against 
dehumanizing poverty. Governance that is not delivering broad 
improvement in people’s lives because it is stealing, 
squandering, or skewing the available resources….. Where 
power confers virtually unchecked opportunities for personal, 
factional, and party enrichment, it is difficult if not impossible to 
sustain democratic rules of the game. The democratic spirit of 
elections drowns in vote-buying, rigging, violence, or all three.20    
                                                 
18 Ibid. p. 171 
19 Isham, Kaufmann, Pritchett (1997) p. 222 
20 Diamond (2007) p. 119 
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Diamond further argues that the idea that the pathologies of “bad governance” 
can be cured with more “democracy assistance” is not convincing because such 
assistance does not reach the deeper levels of the political culture in societies 
that are dominated by clientilism or endemic corruption. If such practices are 
“deeply embedded in the norms and expectations” of what political and 
economic exchanges are seen as, improvement will require nothing less than 
“revolutionary change in institutions”.21 Here, Diamond echoes the Romanian 
political scientist Alina Mungui-Pippi, who has leveled a similar type of 
criticism against efforts by for example the European Union to curb corruption 
in former East European countries. She argues that since “bad governance” is 
deeply entrenched in a “particularistic” political culture, the often very technical 
measures that have been launched do not reach the roots of the problem. 
According to her, the root of the problem is the lack of a “norm of 
universalism” in political culture.22 Moreover, one should keep in mind that the 
two states that have made the greatest progress in promoting “good governance” 
– Singapore and Hong Kong – have not been and are still not democracies.23 It 
thus seems fair to say that to achieve social, political and economic 
development in poor and transition countries, establishing electoral 
representative democracy is not enough. The problem with “bad governance” 
has a distinctive social, economic and political logic of its own right.24 
 
 
QoG and the Economic Growth Debate 
 
The argument about the relation between QoG and economic growth comes 
from a variety of sources. One is what can be called “the institutional 
revolution” in economics of which Nobel Laureate Douglass C. North is maybe 
the most prominent researcher. It should however be stressed that North has not 
                                                 
21 Diamond (2008) p. 120 
22 Mungui-Pippidi (2006) p. 87 
23 Uslaner (2008) 
24 Rothstein & Teorell (2008) 
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only emphasized the importance of legal or semi-legal institutions for economic 
growth. On the contrary, there is a strong “cultural” line in his argumentation 
which includes things like “shared mental models” and “the belief system of 
societies”. In many of his writings, North actually gives more weight to the 
informal (cultural) institutions for economic growth than to the formal ones. For 
example, he argues that for making impersonal productive economic exchange 
generally possible, societies need a certain set of institutional frameworks. 
However, “while formal rules can help in creating such frameworks, it is the 
informal constraints embodied in norms of behavior, conventions, and internally 
imposed codes of conduct that are critical”.25 Thus, there is a close relation 
between North’s arguments and those mentioned above that stress the role of 
the basic political and social norms in a society.  
 
Another reason behind the institutional revolution in economics comes from 
development research. The idea that efficient markets could be created only by 
deregulations and/or privatizations have not fared well. Shock-therapy 
capitalism has, to put it mildly, run into a number of problems because its 
proponents did not pay adequate attention to the need for institutions that would 
hinder fraudulent, anti-competitive and other similar types of behaviour 
(Kornai, Rothstein & Rose-Ackerman 2004). If, for example, public contracts 
are given only to economic agents that are “well-connected”, belong to a 
specific ethnic majority, or have paid bribes, the economy is likely to suffer. 
Similarly, if workers that are threatened by unemployment have no social 
protection nets (unemployment benefits, possibilities for vocational training, 
etc.), they or their unions may prevent rationalization and structural change of 
the economy. This problem has nicely been captured by economist Dani Rodrik 
in a recent publication: 
 
The encounter between neo-classical economics and developing 
societies served to reveal the institutional underpinnings of 
market economies. A clearly delineated system of property 
                                                 
25 North (1998), see North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) 
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rights; a regulatory apparatus curbing the worst forms of fraud, 
anti-competitive behavior, and moral hazard; a moderately 
cohesive society exhibiting trust and social cooperation; social 
and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social 
conflicts; the rule of law and clean government--these are social 
arrangements that economists usually take for granted, but which 
are conspicuous by their absence in poor countries.26 
 
As part of this discussion, a large number of studies in the good governance 
field have focused on the economic effects of QoG. For example, Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón find that “a one standard deviation improvement in 
governance leads to between a 2.5-fold (in the case of voice and accountability) 
and a 4-fold (in the case of political instability and violence) increase in per 
capita income”.27 Similarly, Kaufmann finds that: 
 
an improvement in rule of law by one standard deviation from the 
low levels in Ukraine to those “middling” levels prevailing in 
South Africa would lead to a fourfold increase in per capita income 
in the long run. A larger increase in the quality of rule of law (by 
two standard deviations) in Ukraine (or in other countries in the 
former Soviet Union), to the much higher level in Slovenia or 
Spain, would further multiply this income per capita increase. 
Similar results emerge from civil liberties or control of corruption 
improvements: a mere one standard deviation improvement in 
voice and accountability from the low level of Venezuela to that of 
South Korea, or in control of corruption from the low level of 
Indonesia to the middling level of Mexico, or from the level of 
Mexico to that of Costa Rica, would also be associated with an 
estimated fourfold increase in per capita incomes […]28  
 
Critics of such findings, however, come from two directions. The first criticism 
comes from those who point to the issue of reverse causality. For example, 
Goldsmith states that “counter to optimistic claims about how much ‘institutions 
matter’, […] greater transparency, accountability, and participation are often a 
result, rather than a direct cause of faster development”.29 He arrives at this 
                                                 
26 Rodrik (2007) p. 153 
27 Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobatón (1999) p. 15 
28 Kaufmann (2004) p. 15 
29 Goldsmith (2007) p. 165 
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conclusion by analyzing the history of specific governance reforms and the 
economic development of the United States, Argentina, Mauritius, and Jamaica. 
He shows that in the United States and Argentina, economic growth took off 
before major governance reforms had been adopted. Moreover, it is argued that 
despite Mauritius and Jamaica having similar sets of institutions, their 
development paths have been very different.30 These observations lead him to 
form the following conclusions: 
 
(1) Meritocratic bureaucracies, independent judiciaries, and 
honest elections are worthy goals in their own right, but setting 
them up need not give a perceptible jolt to development; (2) 
provided other conditions are favorable, fairly objectionable 
public institutions may be adequate for an upsurge in production 
and income; (3) good governance reforms are more effect than 
cause of sped-up development, although over time they seem to 
become a more important factor in sustaining development; (4) 
when the rate of development picks up, so may graft and 
extortion, although often any escalation in corruption prompts 
countervailing political demand for anti-corruption measures to 
be enacted.31 
 
According to this view, then, it is the process of industrialization that has a 
tendency to give rise to better institutions. Similar conclusions are drawn by 
other researchers who point to an endogeneity problem that is inherent when 
linking good governance and economic growth. These methodological problems 
in the research, they claim, have contributed to an overestimation of the effects 
of good governance (Przeworski 2004; Glaeser et al. 2004). Nevertheless, seen 
from a 19th century European perspective, the historical record can be 
interpreted to support both cases. The English case seems to give evidence for 
the importance of the “QoG causes economic growth” hypothesis.32 The 
Swedish case seems also to indicate that a large number of institutional reforms 
                                                 
30 Ibid. p. 170-181 
31 Ibid. p. 181 
32 North (1990) 
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in the “good governance” direction were implemented just before 
industrialization and the following economic growth started.33  
 
It should be underlined that one is not likely to encounter a straightforward 
sequential logic here. It is very unlikely that a country can first set up a full-
blown set of good governance institutions and as an effect of this would start to 
develop. First, as Grindle has argued, the “full-set” is a very tall order.34 It is not 
only independent courts and the rule of law, but also institutions for effective 
taxation, auditing, patents, an effective police force, an enforcement service, a 
bureau for land rights, inheritance law, a companies act, and so on. Secondly, 
from what we now think we know about how social causation works, we should 
expect to find things like “feed-back mechanisms”, “auto-correlation” and 
“path-dependency” making what is the “independent” and “dependant” variable 
in this story very difficult to sort out.35 To this we have to add that we are not 
likely to find effects of just the formal establishment of institutions, but instead 
of how people in general come to perceive the credibility of such institutions.  
 
Despite these criticisms, there are those who support the idea that good 
governance leads to economic growth but still criticize the good governance 
agenda. Their criticism focuses on how this economic growth translates into 
reduced poverty and income inequality. For example, there are those who argue 
that the policy implications of QoG tend to emphasize small governments, 
which could be viewed as being anti-poor.36 Shepherd, for example argues that: 
 
Civil service reform has succeeded in cutting numbers of 
government employees, but has failed to deal with lower-level 
salary problems, which result in continued widespread informal 
payment systems, other forms of corruption and low levels of 
motivation and system potential. CSR [civil service reform] has 
not been harmonized with universal primary education or basic 
                                                 
33 Myhrman (2003), Rothstein (1998) and (2007) 
34 Grindle (2004) 
35 Hall (2003) 
36 Shepherd (2000) p. 270 
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health policies, which have usually needed more teachers and more 
health workers. There is a need to focus on service delivery outputs 
and outcomes rather than inputs: then CSR would be a powerful 
instrument.37 
 
His conclusion is that even though good governance reforms may be necessary, 
they in themselves are not sufficient to reduce poverty. Rather, targeted 
development actions must be taken, particularly in sectors such as education and 
health.38 
 
On the other hand, the supporters of the good governance agenda argue that the 
poor suffer most under bad governments, so reforms toward good governance 
will benefit the poor. According to this view, taking action to reduce corruption, 
increasing access to legal services for the poor, improving ethics among the 
police to reduce discrimination against the poor, promoting democratic 
institutions, increasing the quality and efficiency of public good services, and 
managing the economy well will benefit poor people in the long term.39 In their 
cross-country study for the period 1960-1990, Chong and Calderón find support 
for this view. Their findings show a negative and significant relationship 
between institutional quality and poverty. They state that “the more efficient a 
country’s institutions, the lower the level, incidence, and severity of poverty”.40 
The risk of expropriation and the quality of the bureaucracy are shown to matter 
most for poverty levels, while corruption and law and order matter less. Chong 
and Calderón theorize that this is because the poor usually live in rural areas 
where the central government’s hold is weaker. Therefore what matters most is 
to affect those things that have a direct bearing on the poor, such as the 
insecurity of expropriations and the inefficiencies of service delivery.41 Chong 
and Calderón also put forth the notion that institutional reform may at first 
                                                 
37 Ibid. p. 282 
38 Ibid. p. 283 
39 Ibid. p. 270 
40 Chong and Calderón (2000) p. 130 
41 Ibid. p.130-131 
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increase poverty in a country because of high initial transaction costs until the 
new system has started to function efficiently.42 
 
This line of reasoning could be connected to the argument made by 
development economist Hernande de Soto about what can be called the social 
construction of capital.43 To give a short recapitulation of de Soto’s well-known 
argument: Capital is not the same as assets or even property. For assets/property 
to become capital, it has to become a universally accepted legal construction by 
which ownership is generally respected. Through such a normative/legal 
institutional invention, assets/property that become capital can be used for 
example as security for loans for investing in small enterprises. The point is that 
de Soto shows that for this to happen in the Western world it took a long and 
very complex process of legal institutional building that in some cases lasted for 
several hundred years. The feudal idea of what constituted property was for 
example very different from the modern/capitalist idea. According to de Soto, 
assets cannot be transformed to and used as capital until it is recognized by “all” 
others, and that demands not only a strong legal “good governance”  framework 
but also a Douglass North type of change of minds of both “people in general”  
and especially those that are to be entrusted with responsibility for securing 
property rights.  
 
Our general impression from this research is that there appears to be a 
consensus that a link between good governance and economic outcome exists, 
although the causality and the benefits to the poor are somewhat contested. 
Several commentators point to a need to develop more rigorous theoretical 
frameworks on how the good governance agenda can lead to pro-poor growth 
(Grindle 2004; Resnick and Birner 2006). 
 
 
                                                 
42 Ibid. p. 125 
43 de Soto (2000) 
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The Corruption Debate 
 
The opening pages of the United Nation’s report Global Programme against 
Corruption state that “the most significant achievement in governance during 
the 1990s was the shattering of the taboo that barred discussion of corruption, 
particularly in diplomatic circles and intergovernmental institutions.” It is 
difficult to say why this taboo existed for such a long time – one idea is that 
pointing at the “C” problem in developing countries could be seen as “blaming 
the victim”. Another is that pointing out corruption in developing countries 
would have decreased political support for international aid in many countries.  
Until the mid-1990s, the World Bank also saw corruption as an internal political 
problem and since the Bank was forbidden to interfere in a country’s internal 
politics, corruption was outside its agenda. This all changed when former World 
Bank President James D. Wolfensohn simply redefined corruption as an 
economic problem. In an interview in 2005, he stated the following: “Ten years 
ago, when I came here, the Bank never talked about corruption, and now we are 
doing programs in more than a hundred countries, and it is a regular subject for 
discussion”44.    
 
This resistance to engaging with corruption also prevailed in much of the social 
sciences. For example, the Handbook of Development Economics, published in 
four volumes between 1988 and 1995, does not have an index entry with the 
term “corruption”. Moreover, most undergraduate level textbooks in political 
science and economics still do not give corruption any attention. During the last 
decade, however, corruption and other problems of dysfunctional governance 
have received increasing attention in the social sciences, not least as a result of 
the “institutional revolution” in economics and political science (Levi 2006). 
 
Today, a vast literature on the effects of corruption exists. While some authors 
argue that particular types of corruption can have a positive effect on economic 
                                                 
44 http://discuss.worldbank.org/content/interview/detail/2058/ 
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development (Nye 1967; Khan 1996, 1998), most studies point to the negative 
consequences of corruption (Mauro 1995; Akçay 2006; Transparency 
International 2008; Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 2002). According to the 
first view, corruption can take different forms, some of which is efficiency-
enhancing and some of which is efficiency-reducing. Hence, a cost-benefit 
analysis must be carried out to establish the overall effect of corruption (Nye 
1967; Khan 1996, 1998). According to the opposite view, corruption has 
negative effects on GDP growth (Mo 2001), income inequality and poverty 
(Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002), human development (Akçay 2006) 
and health outcomes (Transparency International 2006). The mechanism here is 
that corruption acts like an illegal tax that distorts decision-making and 
economic processes.  
 
A review of the literature on the effects of corruption on human development by 
Akçay (2006) shows that “corruption can indirectly affect human development 
by lowering economic growth and incentives to invest.” Several studies show 
that corruption influences what the government spends on education and health 
(Mauro 1998; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 1998)). Akçay’s own 
empirical results confirm this by showing that higher levels of corruption indeed 
lower human development (as measured by life expectancy, educational 
attainment, and standard of living).45 Kaufmann similarly finds that a one 
standard deviation improvement in control of corruption would reduce child 
mortality by 75 percent, as well as lead to significant gains in literacy.46 
Corruption also tends to distort the allocation of economic benefits, favoring the 
haves over the have-nots - leading to a less equitable income distribution. A 
share of the country’s wealth is distributed to insiders and corrupt bidders, 
contributing to inequalities in wealth.47 
 
                                                 
45 Ibid. p. 41 
46 Kaufmann (2004) p. 15-16 
47 Akçay (2006) p. 33-34 
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Thus, corruption generally has negative consequences for human development 
because it reduces economic growth and diverts money from social services.  
 
The Rule of Law Debate 
 
At the opening of the 17th session of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, the Executive Director of the UN on Drugs and Crime, 
Antonio Maria Costa, delivered a speech titled “Rule of Law:  A (missing) 
Millennium Development Goal that can help reach the other MDGs”. In the 
speech he emphasized the need for stronger rule of law to meet the MDGs: 
 
Economic analysis has consistently shown the clear correlation 
between weak rule of law and weak socio-economic 
performance. Clear correlation, I said, though some people 
actually see strong causality: in countries ravaged by crime and 
corruption, and where governments lost control of their land, the 
poor suffer the most, and the services provided to them get 
delayed, or never arrive. They -- the so-called "bottom billion" -- 
have no access to justice, health and education and face rising 
food prices: how can such countries meet the MDGs?48 
 
Empirical studies often support the view that the rule of law is important for 
economic development. Kaufmann and Kraay, for instance, show that a one-
standard-deviation improvement in the rule of law indicator “raises per capita 
income nearly fourfold in the very long run”.49 Moreover, poor countries do not 
score well on the rule-of-law indicator whereas all rich countries do (except for 
less well-scoring Italy and Greece).50 On the other hand, critics point to the 
example of China, which has witnessed unprecedented growth without scoring 
well on the rule-of-law indicator. In this view, rule of law cannot be seen as “a 
universal economic guide” as it may not be a prerequisite for growth.51 Messick 
also offers a warning in viewing rule of law as a panacea. He argues that cross-
                                                 
48 Costa (2008) 
49 Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) p. 18 
50 The Economist (2008) 
51 Ibid. 
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country regressions do not satisfactorily answer the question of causality. First, 
developed countries can spend more on their judicial system. Secondly,  
 
the same factors that contribute to economic reform and 
development may also be responsible for improvements in the 
judiciary. Both may be a result of preexisting attitudes and beliefs 
in society at large, or what has recently been termed "social 
capital".52 
 
Social capital is often understood as historically established norms of 
generalized trust and honest reciprocity. One can argue that social capital 
understood in this way is equivalent to the type of informal institutions put 
forward by North and Mungui-Pippidi as presented above. However, as has 
been shown by Rothstein, Eek and Stolle, there are relatively strong empirical 
indicators showing that precisely the opposite may be the case, namely that 
social trust is caused by high quality legal institutions.53 
  
Keeping with the view that rule of law may be a “luxury good” which is hard to 
attain by poor countries, Messick further points to the evolution of informal 
institutions into formal institutions. Informal institutions such as credit 
associations are usually widespread at the village level in close-knit 
communities. Economic development tends to put these informal methods, 
which rely on personal trust, at a disadvantage compared to more formal 
mechanisms. Furthermore, by citing Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), 
Messick shows how the trading system in Europe during the medieval period 
was based on reputation, where traders had an incentive not to cheat, and how 
this informal system became too costly over time to maintain. As the number of 
actors rose, the transaction costs of verifying the reputation of the traders also 
increased. This, it is argued, eventually led to the formalization of the legal 
system.54  
 
                                                 
52 Messick (1999) p. 122 
53 Rothstein and Stolle (2008), Rothstein & Eek (2009) 
54 Messick (1999) p. 130 
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However, how such “efficient” institutions as the rule of law can be created 
remains somewhat of a mystery, at least if the starting point is transactions 
between agents that are utility-maximizers. The theory would predict that some 
agents, through the logic of the market, will eventually become much more 
financially strong than others. If rational utility-maximizers, they are likely to 
use their financial strength to bribe or corrupt the people working in the legal 
system in one way or another to gain economic advantages. They will also try to 
get their confidants in this sort of clientilism and corruption installed in 
positions in order to render verdicts in their favor. And if they are also rational 
utility-maximizers, the integrity of the law merchants will be for sale as long as 
the price is right and the transaction can be kept secret.  Such a scenario seems 
to be a rather apt description of events in Russia after the “shock-therapy” 
privatizations of the 1990s. The economic oligarchies seem to have become so 
financially strong that they have managed to buy attempts to build universal 
trustworthy rule of law institutions out of existence.55 This problem, which in 
some ways is fundamental to this discussion, has been stated as follows by 
economic historian Avner Greif in a chapter in the Handbook of Institutional 
Economics: 
 
public-order institutions that support modern markets require high 
fixed costs. Large legislative, judicial, administrative, and 
coordination costs are required to establish the system and render it 
effective and credible…. Public-order institutions that best 
approximate this situation operate in a few advanced contemporary 
countries and only in recent times. We know surprisingly little, 
however, regarding the institutional development that led to these 
modern successes.56 
 
Thus, although the empirical evidence points to a relationship between rule of 
law and economic development, the nature of this relationship remains open to 
debate. It may be, however, that the rule of law is good in its own right, as it is 
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believed that the rule of law improves human rights and reduces conflicts.57 
One criticism is that in many areas, such as service delivery, environme
protection, and education, the rule of law “script” is too restricted for describing 
the “street-level bureaucrats” operational logic. Public employees in these 
sectors are more inclined to use a combination of professional norms and policy 
goals instead of following clearly defined legal rules. The implication is that 
what should count as quality of government must be based on a norm that 
incorporates what takes place in the exercise of public policies where the rule of 
law concept is inadequate (Rothstein & Teorell 2008). 
ntal 
                                                
 
 
The Policy Outcomes of Quality of Government 
 
As the preceding discussion has shown, quality of government is a broad topic 
that in recent years has been the focus of much research. Nevertheless, many of 
the debates in this field remain to be settled because of the lack of strong and 
robust empirical indicators, for example on the topics of whether good 
governance in general and democracy in particular promote economic growth.58 
Our own results, as presented in tables 2 (correlations) and 3 (regression 
coefficients) as well as in figures 4 and 5, show that the three QoG variables 
(Rule of Law, Corruption Perception and Government Effectiveness) have 
positive but surprisingly weak correlations with economic growth, while the 
correlation with GDP/capita is very strong. One interpretation of this result 
could be that the causality between economic growth and QoG is more like a 
“virtuous circle” where “feed-back mechanisms” play an important role. As 
Dani Rodrik has stressed, “I am not aware of any strong econometric evidence 
that relates standard governance criteria to growth (all the evidence is about 
income levels)” (Rodrik 2008:19). 
 
57 The Economist (2008) 
58 “In spite of the inexorable march of democracy around the globe, just how democratic 
institutions affect human well-being is open to debate. The evidence that democracy promotes 
prosperity is neither strong nor robust”. Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) p. 313 
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 These results are central to the wider question of what the policy outcomes of 
QoG are. As will be evident in the following section, a country’s GDP is one of 
its major determinants of policy outcomes in such fields as social well-being, 
public health, and the environment. Building on the discussions of the previous 
section, we will therefore explore in greater detail the effects of QoG on these 
policy areas. 
 
In the topic of social well-being, we include such indicators as poverty, 
economic inequality, the existence of effective social insurance systems, 
subjective measures of life satisfaction, and the United Nations’ measure of 
human development (HDI). As was mentioned above, there is a debate about 
whether QoG necessarily leads to pro-poor growth (i.e. economic growth that 
reduces absolute or relative levels of poverty). Kraay (2006) explores this using 
household survey data on average incomes from 80 developing countries mainly 
from the 1990s. He shows that what matters most for poverty reduction is 
growth in average incomes. However, poverty reduction is also affected by 
distributional changes. Using the World Bank’s rule of law indicator as a proxy 
for institutional quality, he finds that “poverty increasing distributional change 
is more likely to occur in countries with better institutional quality”. 
Nevertheless, he argues that this negative distributional effect on poverty in 
countries with better institutional quality is outweighed by the positive effect of 
institutional quality on economic growth.59 Using a different methodology, 
Blaydes and Kayser (2007) arrive at the opposite conclusion when examining 
the link between democracy and pro-poor growth. They argue that even though 
democracy may not promote economic growth, democratic countries are more 
likely than autocratic states to promote economic redistribution that is beneficial 
to the poor. Blaydes and Kayser accredit this to democratic countries’ 
investments in human capital development, and the benefits of competitive 
elections to poor voters who are often marginalized in autocracies. The 
                                                 
59 Kraay (2004) p. 20 
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corruption literature makes similar inferences on the link between QoG and 
poverty. Research shows that corruption affects poverty through its 
consequences on economic and governance factors, such as through lower 
quality of public infrastructure, decreases in tax revenue, and poorer targeting of 
social programs (Chetwynd et al 2003). 
 
One example of corruption’s effect on poverty can be found in Anirudh 
Krishna's (2007) study of poverty in developing countries. Based on a vast 
amount of data from 25,000 households from diverse communities in India, 
Kenya, Uganda, Peru, and North Carolina, Krishna finds that people in 
developing countries move in and out of poverty to a great extent. He also finds 
that one of the strongest reasons for people in developing countries becoming 
permanently poor is that members of their family are hit by a serious illness, for 
which they have to spend large sums of money on health care because they do 
not have access to any publicly funded health care system. The cost of medical 
treatment for family members often forces them to sell productive assets and 
because of this they fall deeply into debt. One reason for the lack of publicly 
available health care is that corruption, not least in the tax authorities, makes it 
difficult to raise taxes to finance a public health care system. 
 
Other studies focus more directly on the empirical link between governance and 
inequality. The results here are also rather mixed. For example, Chong and 
Gradstein (2004) find that better ranking on the political stability and the rule of 
law measures, as well as the ICRG index, lead to a decrease in inequality. Lopez 
(2004), on the other hand, finds the opposite result using the ICRG index.60 
However, Chong and Calderón (2000) show that in richer countries, quality of 
institutions and income equality have a positive relationship while in poorer 
countries the reverse relationship holds. They argue that this may be because 
institutional reforms first increase income inequality before decreasing it when 
institutional efficiency improves. Borrowing from Olson’s (1996) theories on 
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economic development and institutions, they theorize that bad governance often 
entails state capture by specific groups who prosper at the expense of the poor. 
Thus, in the long run, governance reform will reduce inequality by removing 
discrimination against the marginalized section of the population.61 As shown in 
tables 2 and 3, the relationships between the QoG variables and measures of 
inequality (unemployment and the relative poverty rate, see figure 6) are 
reasonably strong. Tables 2 and 3 also show positive correlations between the 
QoG variables and policy measures for reducing inequality such as “benefit 
generosity index” and the measure of social security laws.   
 
Thus, a high QoG appears to have positive effects on social well-being. This 
result echoes that of Helliwell (2006), Frey and Stutzer (2000), and Pacek and 
Radcliff (2008), who have observed positive links between QoG and subjective 
well-being (a measure of an individual’s evaluation of their quality of life in 
total). Helliwell reports that QoG - as measured by the averages of six main 
World Bank indicators - explains a large part of the international differences in 
subjective well-being found through surveys. Frey and Stutzer observe in a 
more narrow study that direct democracy appears to be associated with higher 
levels of well-being. They explain this positive effect by pointing to political 
outcomes as agreeing more with the voters’ preferences as well as the utility 
obtained from participating in the political process. Finally, Pacek and Radcliff 
find a positive link between welfare state generosity and subjective well-being 
when examining survey data from 18 industrial democracies between the years 
1981-2000. It is concluded that the higher the “quality of welfare policy” (as 
measured by the comprehensiveness of social security programs, including 
pensions, sickness compensation and unemployment support), the greater 
individuals are satisfied with their lives. One reason for this, they believe, is that 
welfare states better protect their citizens from the insecurities produced by the 
market, thereby increasing their quality of life.  
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Overall, therefore, the effect of QoG variables on social well-being appears as a 
complex pattern that is affected by intermediaries such as economic and 
institutional factors. Nevertheless, most evidence – including our own empirical 
results – points to positive outcomes of QoG on policy areas such as reduced 
poverty and higher degrees of life satisfaction. 
 
Turning next to the public health field, there is a large body of literature that 
testifies to the negative consequences of corruption in the health sector. The 
Global Corruption Report 2006, for example, explores why the health sector is 
particularly prone to corruption and shows how the problem impacts upon 
health systems in both developed and developing countries. As three of the 
Millennium Development Goals relate to health outcomes (reducing child 
mortality, improving maternal health, and combating diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS and malaria) reducing corruption in this sector is imperative.62 
Embezzlement and theft, corruption in procurement, corruption in payment 
systems, corruption in the pharmaceutical supply chain, and corruption at the 
point of health service delivery are all identified as major challenges for the 
health sector.63 The effects are that service delivery is impaired through 
increasing the costs of key services, creating obstacles for those who are least 
able to pay, and limiting the scope for reforms to raise health care quality and 
efficiency.64  
 
Empirical studies are made difficult by the range of health care systems that 
exist in the world – the difference being particularly noticeable between 
developed and developing countries - which leads to a scarcity of comparable 
data. However, a review of the literature shows that significant dividends can be 
gained when reducing corruption in the health sector. Gupta, Davoodi and 
Tiongson (2000), for example, study eighty-nine countries over a period 
between 1985 and 1997 and find that corruption has adverse consequences for 
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child and infant mortality rates and the percent of low-birth weight babies.65 
Similarly, Rajkumar and Swaroop use cross-sectional data of countries over two 
years and find that in countries with less corruption and better quality of 
bureaucracy, health spending has a negative correlation with child and infant 
mortalities. With an improvement in control of corruption, public spending on 
the health sector becomes more effective in reducing child and infant 
mortalities.66 Moreover, Eslava-Schmalback et al. show that inequity in health 
is higher in countries with more corruption.67  
 
Another study, conducted by Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), explores the link 
between democracy and health by employing panel data from a cross section of 
countries. They find that health policy interventions are superior in 
democracies. Further, their results show that countries that have been 
democratic from 1956 onwards have a life expectancy that is about five years as 
high as that for countries that have been autocratic in the same period. The 
democratic countries also have about 17 fewer infants dying before the age of 
one per 1,000 births as compared to countries that have been continuously 
autocratic since 1956. They accredit this to democracies having greater 
representation and accountability, so that health issues are promoted, and that 
voters in democratic countries can elect competent leaders.68 Another of the 
results in the study indicate that democracies prioritize water and sanitation 
issues, which according to the Global Corruption Report 2008 are responsible 
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for about 80 per cent of the health problems in developing countries. The Report 
singles out corruption as one of the root causes for the water crisis in many 
countries. It states that “corruption in the water sector is widespread and makes 
water undrinkable, inaccessible and unaffordable.”69 
 
As shown in tables 2 and 3 as well as in figure 1, there are strong positive 
relations between the three QoG variables and four widely used measures of 
health outcomes (subjective health, life expectancy, infant mortality and child 
mortality). This may be caused in part by the relatively strong correlations we 
show in tables 2 and 3 between QoG variables and the measures of water 
quality (see also figure 2). Since health seems to be causally connected to 
survey measures of life satisfaction and happiness, it is not surprising that we 
also find positive correlations between these measures of “how’s life” and the 
QoG variables. This is especially highlighted in figure 7, where we have 
combined three quality of life variables from the health studies literature (life 
expectancy, infant mortality, and life satisfaction) into a Good Society Index 
(GSI), which is strongly related to the QoG variables. The results indicate that 
high quality of government increases our chances of achieving the Good Society 
(Holmberg 2007). 
 
While most studies find a causal relationship between QoG and public health, 
the same cannot be said for the effects of QoG variables on environmental 
outcomes. Here the debate is complicated by the lack of an unambiguous 
definition of the concept of environmental sustainability. This is because it is a 
broad term that encompasses a range of issues, which has led to the creation of a 
plethora of competing sustainability indexes (Böhringer and Jochem 2007). 
Consequently, empirical results are largely determined by the choice of the 
sustainability index used in the study. For instance, while Morse (2006) finds 
that corruption has a negative correlation with environmental sustainability (as 
measured by the Environmental Sustainability Index [ESI]), Ewers and Smith 
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(2007) obtain an opposite result using the Ecological Footprint index. The 
differences arise because the Ecological Footprint emphasizes measurement of a 
country’s impact on the planet through its consumption patterns, in contrast to 
the ESI’s broader measurements, which include a country’s pollution levels, 
environmental management, capacity to improve environmental performance, 
etc. The question therefore appears to be whether one should assign a high 
significance to ratifications of environmental agreements, technological 
advances, and reductions in pollution levels, or to a country’s impact on the 
planet in total. In other words: 
 
If sustainability is viewed in terms of capacity and global 
stewardship, then the richer countries do well relative to the 
poorer ones, while if sustainability is seen in terms of the stress 
placed on the environment, then the richer countries come out 
worse.70 
 
Nevertheless, if one focuses on a country’s level of water and air pollution, then 
empirical studies have revealed a number of mechanisms through which QoG 
variables can have an effect on environmental outcomes. The so-called 
environmental Kuznets Curve has been shown to hold for some pollutants, 
particularly those that have local impacts; pollution increases as countries 
develop from a low level of GDP per capita and subsequently fall when 
people’s preferences change in favor of preserving the environment at higher 
levels of income. This means that corruption can play a direct and an indirect 
role in affecting pollution levels. The direct effect takes place by increasing 
pollution at any given income level through for example the practice of bribing 
officials to bypass pollution laws71. The indirect effect of corruption, on the 
other hand, can be either positive or negative, depending on how pollution 
interacts with economic development at a certain level of per capita income 
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(Welsch 2004; López and Mitra 2000). Empirical investigations are thus 
required in order to determine which effect plays a larger role in the equation.  
 
Welsch (2004) uses different indicators of ambient air and water pollution for 
106 countries and finds that corruption enhances pollution at all income levels. 
He argues that low income countries have the most to gain in terms of reduced 
air and water pollution by reducing corruption. Damania et al. (2003) similarly 
find that lower corruption is correlated with tougher environmental regulations 
by investigating allowable lead content per gallon of gasoline. Nevertheless, 
their study shows that developing countries are conditionally better at having 
lower levels of lead per gallon of gasoline than developed countries if per capita 
income is taken into consideration.72 
 
Fredriksson and Mani (2002) explore the interaction of rule of law with 
corruption and demonstrate that environmental policy stringency is lowest in 
countries with a low degree of rule of law and high level of corruption. They 
also show that with a high degree of rule of law, the negative effect of 
corruption on environmental stringency grows, due to the increased incentives 
of bribing officials in order to circumvent environmental laws. Fredriksson and 
Mani therefore conclude that greater policy stringency must go hand in hand 
with efforts to reduce corruption if environmental policies are to have the 
intended effects. Esty and Porter (2005) also find that institutional factors play a 
role in explaining environmental performance in terms of urban particulates and 
energy efficiency, although income levels appear to be the dominant factor in 
determining environmental outcome. They therefore conclude that 
environmental policy makers should prioritize poverty alleviation. 
 
Other studies have focused on the link between democracy and environmental 
policy. Neumayer (2002), for example, finds evidence of a positive association 
between democracy and environmental commitment, in terms of the ratification 
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of environmental agreements, participation in international environmental 
organizations, assigning protection status to a greater percentage of their land 
area, etc. He warns, however, that this does not necessarily translate into 
environmental outcomes: 
 
In democracies, people can express their environmental 
preferences better, these preferences will be honored or 
addressed better by policymakers and this should translate into 
stronger revealed environmental commitment. But it need not 
translate into better environmental outcomes. The link between 
democracy and environmental outcomes is likely to be weaker 
the more factors outside a government's control impact upon 
outcomes, the longer the time-span between environmental 
commitment and its effect on environmental outcomes is and the 
more difficult environmental outcomes are to monitor. If these 
conditions hold true, then the electorate in a democracy will 
appreciate the difficulty of holding governments accountable for 
environmental outcomes rather than commitment and will look 
for commitment instead.73 
 
Barrett and Graddy (2000) look at the link between civil and political freedoms 
and environmental quality and find that some of the pollutants that have the 
most adverse effects on human health are lower in countries with greater civil 
and political freedoms.74 In a different study, Fredriksson and Wollscheid look 
at environmental policy stringency and democracy and show that democracies 
have stricter environmental policies than autocracies. However, they argue that 
this result appears to be driven primarily by parliamentary democracies, 
whereas presidential-congressional systems often do not set environmental 
policies that are significantly different compared to those of non-democracies. 
They accredit this to the lower degree of separation of powers and greater 
legislative cohesion in parliamentary systems.75 In addition, there appears to be 
some evidence as well that the transition from autocracy to democracy may 
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result in widespread environmental degradation if the period is marked by 
political instability. Examples of this could be seen in Indonesia after the fall of 
Suharto in 1998, when the rate of deforestation increased.76  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show that environmental outcomes correlate positively with 
QoG, which confirms some of the associations found in the previous literature 
(see also figure 2). On the other hand, the QoG variables can be seen to have a 
negative effect on carbon emissions, which is also in line with previous studies 
that find that the less local a particular type of pollution is and the more 
externalities it has, the less likely governments are to tackle the pollution (see 
figure 3). Overall, therefore, although significant relationships can be found 
between QoG and environmental outcomes, care should be taken in interpreting 
these results. As many studies point out, this is due to the broadness of the 
concept of environmental sustainability, the weakness of some of the data, and 
the difficulties in assigning cause and effect because of the many interactions 
with economic performance and other contextual factors. 
 
Future Research on Quality of Government 
 
Our research review merely presents a small section of the now vast literature 
that exists on QoG. Nevertheless, some general observations can be made. 
Firstly, while QoG appears to be a worthy cause to pursue, the research on the 
topic remains thin in a number of areas. For example, Resnick and Birner 
mention cross-country studies focusing on the political process as an interaction 
variable as being absent from the literature.77 Others point to the weakness in 
theoretical foundation in some areas, such as the interdependent nature of 
institutions. Goldsmith, for instance, seeks greater efforts in “capturing 
nonlinear and lagged relationships in governance”.78 A related point of criticism 
is that the research on good governance does not easily translate into simply 
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executed policies. To start with, there is little agreement for example on what 
type of rule of law or what form of democracy that is required for a country to 
reap the full effects of QoG. Some authors employ a “thick” definition of rule of 
law while others use a “thin” definition, which is more formal. The former only 
considers states as being ruled by law “if the state’s power is constrained and if 
basic freedoms, such as those of speech and association, are guaranteed”. The 
latter, on the other hand, narrows its focus on “property rights and the efficient 
administration of justice”.79 Similarly, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) stress the 
importance of distinguishing between effective and ineffective democracies. 
The narrow definition of democracy focuses on holding regular elections that 
can be considered free and fair and this type is known as “electoral democracy”. 
The broader definition, “Liberal democracy”, maintains that competitive 
elections in themselves do not lead to genuine democracy. Rather, it is argued, 
effective democracy relies on “the wide distribution of participatory resources 
and a trusting, tolerant public that prizes free choice”.80  
 
Helliwell and Huang argue that different countries may require different 
institutional structures at different points in time. Through examining life 
satisfaction in relation to different aspects of good governance in a large cross-
national study, they find that “honest and efficient governments are of especial 
salience for poorer countries, while voice, accountability and political stability 
are of greater relative importance for the richer countries”. They therefore argue 
that “even if at some more fundamental level all individuals have the same basic 
preference structures, the relative costs and benefits of different sorts of 
institutional structure vary with circumstances”.81 
 
Therefore, several studies emphasize the difficulties in drawing clear-cut policy 
conclusions from much of the existing research.82. Another reason for this is 
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that the good governance agenda encompasses virtually anything that is related 
to the public sector, including institutions, bureaucratic systems, decision-
making processes etc. This creates a problem for developing countries, as there 
is little information on which reforms should be carried out first so as to not 
make the transformation overwhelming. Grindle writes about the growing list of 
demands put on developing states to reform without a clear strategy: 
 
The good governance agenda, largely defined by the 
international development community but often fervently 
embraced by domestic reformers, is unrealistically long and 
growing longer over time. Among the governance reforms that 
‘must be done’ to encourage development and reduce poverty, 
there is little guidance about what’s essential and what’s not, 
what should come first and what should follow, what can be 
achieved in the short term and what can only be achieved over 
the longer term, what is feasible and what is not.”83 
 
Grindle argues that more attention should be given to these questions so as to 
make reforms more realistic and effective. Messick is similarly critical of the 
way in which empirical results about the benefits of good governance are 
transformed into policy strategies. He studies the introduction of rule of law 
reforms and argues that these can sometimes have negative side-effects in 
societies that have employed traditional or informal mechanisms. He states, for 
example, that “the sudden introduction of a formal mechanism to resolve legal 
disputes can disrupt informal mechanisms without providing offsetting gains”84. 
Another unintended consequence of focusing on reforms in a particular area, for 
example property rights, before appropriate independent institutions exist is that 
elites may take advantage of this, for instance through land-grabbing, which 
may result in greater inequalities.85  
 
A healthy reminder is that in the 1960s, donors such as USAID and the Ford 
Foundation set out an ambitious task of reforming the judicial systems in a 
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number of developing countries. After a few years, however, some of the key 
individuals involved in the project (known as the ‘law and development’ 
movement) stated that the program had failed.86 The failure has been analyzed 
in a number of studies and some key criticisms have emerged:  
 
One is that the movement lacked any theory of the impact of law 
on development. Practitioners thus had no way to prioritize 
reforms or predict the effects of various measures. A second 
failing was too little participation by the lawyers and others in 
the target country who either would have to carry out the reforms 
or would be affected by them. Foreign legal consultants, through 
a combination of expertise and access to funding, were often able 
to dictate the content and pace of reform. A third problem was 
that the movement focused on the formal legal system to the 
exclusion of customary law and the other informal ways in which 
many people in developing nations order their lives (Trubek and 
Galanter 1974). But perhaps the most significant reason for its 
failure was the naive belief that the American legal system (and 
the legal culture generally), which Trubek and Galanter 
(1974:1062) refer to as "liberal legalism," could be easily 
transplanted to developing countries.87 
 
Perhaps the good governance agenda will fall into the same traps as the ‘law 
and development’ movement did, unless there is more attention on forming 
more rigorous theories about how good governance works and can be 
established in practice. If we consider the notion of democracy, it is clear that 
even countries that have long been considered stable democracies vary a lot in 
their specific institutional configurations. Some are federal and some are not. 
Some have bi-cameral systems and others have only one chamber in Parliament. 
Some have multi-party proportional electoral systems while others are two-party 
systems. Some established democracies have an extended system of judicial 
review while in others the political power of the courts is negligible. In some 
established democracies grass-root initiatives for referendums play an important 
role while in others such political initiatives do not exist. Some democracies 
have strong presidential power while others are parliamentarian systems. The 
                                                 
86 Ibid. p. 125 
87 Ibid. p. 126 
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list can go on. The point is that since all these differences in how to organize 
electoral representative democracy are not mutually exclusive, there are 
innumerable ways in which the specific institutional configuration of what we 
call an established democracy can be institutionalized. The differences we see 
between for example the Swiss and the Danish democracies must be understood 
as resulting from each country’s specific historical trajectory and carries 
whatever legitimacy the systems have from being anchored in such country 
specific history. Still, both systems with their very different institutional 
configurations can be seen as being rooted in one basic democratic norm which, 
according to Robert Dahl, is political equality.88  
 
The obvious parallel to the discussion of QoG and good governance is that for 
different countries we should expect the specific institutional configurations to 
vary. For example, some rule of law systems are based on “common law” while 
others are based on “civil law”. While clearly different, both systems are 
compatible with good governance. The same logic should apply for how to 
organize many other government institutions that exercise public power. The 
implication is that we should expect the specific institutional configuration of 
QoG to show great variation between countries. The reason is that the specific 
institutional arrangements have to be anchored in the specific history and 
culture of their country in order to achieve political legitimacy. If this line of 
reasoning is correct, a simple transfer of institutions as in the “law and 
development” movement is not likely to work. Instead, as with democracy, we 
have to find a “basic norm” for QoG from which different institutional 
arrangement anchored in each country’s historical trajectory can be established.   
 
In the literature we have found three terms that we think describe this “basic 
norm”. Universalism is suggested by Mungui-Pippidi, a term that she defines in 
opposition to a political culture dominated by “particularism”. She defines 
universalism as “equal treatment of citizens” (2006:88). Another suggestion has 
                                                 
88 Dahl (1989) 
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been presented by North, Wallis and Weingast (2006), namely “the open access 
orders” which they contrast to “limited access orders”. In the former, 
competition in markets and politics is open to everyone and based on equal 
terms. A third suggestion for such a “basic norm” has been put forward by 
Rothstein and Teorell, namely impartiality in the exercise of public power,  
which they, following Brian Barry and Håkan Strömberg, define in the 
following way: “When implementing laws and policies, government officials 
shall not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not 
beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law”.89  The differences between these 
three are in reality only terminological since they all point to the same basic 
norm for the relation between the government and its citizens.  
 
To conclude, whilst there are a multitude of studies showing the value of good 
governance, research remains to be done on what good governance really 
entails, what specific institutional forms that can follow from the above 
mentioned basic norm, and how change from low to high QoG can be obtained. 
A lack of solid understanding exists for questions such as causality and what is 
key for QoG in different political, economic and cultural settings. Thus, 
although research points to the value of achieving QoG, a “one size fits all” 
approach is likely not the way forward. More context-specific and historic time-
series studies may aid in resolving the ambiguities that exist in the present state 
of research on the policy effects of QoG. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Rothstein and Teorell (2008) p. 170 
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Table 1. Three QoG variables – Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Corruption Perceptions – with 
all available countries ranked  
C
ountry 
G
overnm
ent 
effectiveness 
rank 
R
ule of law
 
rank 
C
orruption 
perceptions 
rank 
C
ountry 
G
overnm
ent 
effectiveness 
rank 
R
ule of law
 
rank 
C
orruption 
perceptions 
rank 
Singapore 1 15 5 United Arab Emirates 39 33  
Switzerland 2 2 12 Bahrain 40 35  
Luxembourg 3 1 7 Greece 41 46 43 
Netherlands 4 11 7 Hungary 42 38 32 
Finland 5 3 1 Qatar 43 41  
United 
Kingdom 6 14 10 
Czech 
Republic 44 47 51 
Denmark 7 5 2 Latvia 45 60 51 
Iceland 8 4 4 Oman 46 39  
Canada 9 13 7 Tunisia 47 69 35 
New Zealand 10 9 2 Lithuania 48 58 35 
Belgium 11 21 19 Poland 49 54 44 
Australia 12 10 11 South Africa 50 75 35 
Sweden 13 7 5 Uruguay 51 55 31 
Norway 14 6 12 Maldives 52 68  
Austria 15 8 14 Mauritius 53 37 39 
Germany 16 16 17 Antigua and Barbuda 54 32  
United States 17 18 15 Trinidad and Tobago 55 67 32 
France 18 24 24 Costa Rica 56 49 39 
Liechtenstein 19 19  Slovakia 57 62 51 
Ireland 20 17 22 Bhutan 58 72  
Spain 21 28 19 Jordan 59 63 39 
Bahamas 22 25  Grenada 60 70  
Andorra 23 19  Thailand 61 71 63 
Barbados 24 22  Croatia 62 76 50 
Chile 25 27 16 Mexico 63 96 56 
Malta 26 29  China 64 93 58 
Taiwan 27 36 28 Kuwait 65 43  
Japan 28 23 19 Fiji 66 99  
Israel 29 34 17 Dominica 67 50  
Portugal 30 26 24 Namibia 68 59 27 
Cyprus 31 42  Samoa 69 31  
Italy 32 44 30 Morocco 70 77 51 
Malaysia 33 56 32 St Lucia 71 65  
Korea, South 34 40 39 Sri Lanka 72 73 51 
Botswana 35 48 23 Ghana 73 88 49 
Brunei 
Darussalam 36 53  Mauritania 74 100  
Slovenia 37 30 26 Bulgaria 75 82 44 
Estonia 38 45 28 Belize 76 81  
 
Table 1 continued 
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G
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rank 
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C
orruption 
perceptions 
rank 
C
ountry 
G
overnm
ent 
effectiveness 
rank 
R
ule of law
 
rank 
C
orruption 
perceptions 
rank 
Jamaica 77 111 44 Tonga 116 80  
Philippines 78 122 76 Iran 117 124  
Saudi Arabia 79 61  Albania 118 153 80 
Cape Verde 80 74  Argentina 119 138 69 
India 81 79 70 Benin 120 101  
Senegal 82 91 65 Tanzania 121 113 70 
Panama 83 83 66 Laos 122 155  
Turkey 84 84 63 El Salvador 123 106 61 
Mongolia 85 64  Cambodia 124 149  
St Vincent and 
the Grenadines 86 51  Eritrea 125 109  
Brazil 87 97 44 Pakistan 126 132 76 
Seychelles 88 57  Bolivia 127 128 88 
Suriname 89 98  Indonesia 128 148 95 
Marshall 
Islands 90 85  Bangladesh 129 134 101 
Lesotho 91 86  Syria 130 102  
Kiribati 92 52  Guatemala 131 144 80 
St Kitts and 
Nevis 93 65  Burkina Faso 132 117  
Tuvalu 94 12  Cameroon 133 167 88 
Cuba 95 156  Algeria 134 126  
Vanuatu 96 89  Moldova 135 120 92 
Vietnam 97 105 84 Monaco 136   
Micronesia 98 90  Mali 137 114  
Egypt 99 78 61 Malawi 138 108 67 
Guyana 100 112  Sao Tome and Principe 139 118  
Romania 101 87 76 Chad 140 140  
San Marino 102   Serbia and Montenegro 141 154  
Mozambique 103 125  Kyrgyzstan 142 137  
Macedonia 104 110  Rwanda 143 152  
Uganda 105 135 92 Honduras 144 136 70 
Armenia 106 115  Ukraine 145 146 84 
Colombia 108 141 56 Guinea 146 133  
Lebanon 109 95  Zambia 147 119 76 
Swaziland 110 127  Georgia 148 168 84 
Dominican 
Republic 111 104 58 
Papua New 
Guinea 149 151  
Gabon 112 94  Ethiopia 150 107 58 
Madagascar 113 92 97 Kenya 151 160 95 
Nepal 114 103  Zimbabwe 152 177 70 
Peru 115 116 44 Kazakhstan 153 150 87 
Table 1 continued 
C
ountry 
G
overnm
ent 
effectiveness 
rank 
R
ule of law
 
rank 
C
orruption 
perceptions 
rank 
Gambia 154 121  
Niger 155 139  
Yemen 156 170  
Nicaragua 157 130 80 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 158 147  
Djibouti 159 123  
Cote d'Ivoire 160 174 70 
Libya 161 142  
Azerbaijan 162 145 94 
Solomon 
Islands 163 180  
Timor-Leste 164 163  
Ecuador 165 129 88 
Comoros 166 158  
Belarus 167 164 35 
Uzbekistan 168 171 67 
Sudan 169 176  
Nigeria 170 178 100 
Tajikistan 171 175  
Venezuela 172 161 80 
Togo 173 131  
Nauru 174   
Angola 175 181 97 
Paraguay 176 166 97 
Myanmar 177 182  
Congo 178 172  
Guinea-Bissau 179 162  
Equatorial 
Guinea 180 169  
Afghanistan 181 183  
Burundi 182 179  
Sierra Leone 183 173  
Turkmenistan 184 165  
Central African 
Republic 185 159  
Haiti 186 186 88 
Liberia 187 184  
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic 
188 187  
Iraq 189 185  
Korea, North 190 157  
Somalia 191 188  
Comments: The number of countries with relevant data 
are 191 for the government effectiveness variable, 188 
for the rule of law variable, and 101 for the corruption 
variable. High ranks mean “good” QoG qualities. The 
intercorrelations between the three QoG variables are 
very high, about .90. 
Table 2. Correlates of Three Interrelated QoG Variables with Outcomes in the Fields of Health, Ecology, 
Economy, Social Welfare and Subjective Feel Goodness (r) 
 Correlation (r)   
Societal Outcome Variables 
Rule of 
Law  
Government 
Effectiveness  
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
 Effect of 
the QoG 
variables 
   n  n  n  
Health outcomes        
 Subjective Health +.37 45 +.44 45 +.37 39 Positive 
 Life Expectancy at Birth +.62 180 +.62 180 +.53 98 Positive 
 Infant Mortality Rate -.66 178 -.66 180 -.55 94 Positive 
 Mortality Rate Children <5 years -.62 186 -.62 188 -.51 100 Positive 
 Prevalence of HIV -.17 148 -.17 148 -.10 95 Positive 
Environmental Outcomes        
 Environmental Sustainability Index +.50 146 +.51 146 +.54 98 Positive 
 Air Quality +.37 146 +.33 146 +.39 98 Positive 
 Water Quality +.47 146 +.47 146 +.47 98 Positive 
 Improved Drinking Water Source +.57 165 +.57 165 +.58 86 Positive 
 Carbon Emissions +.49 178 +.48 180 +.70 100 Negative 
 Forest Cover Change +.42 172 +.39 172 +.41 92 Positive 
Economic Outcomes        
 GDP per Capita +.88 131 +.87 131 +.87 93 Positive 
 GDP Growth +.10 130 ±.00 130 +.20 93 Positive 
 Gini Index -.44 149 -.44 149 -.46 99 Positive1 
 Unemployment -.47 30 -.46 30 -.48 30 Positive1 
Societal Outcomes/Outputs        
 Social Security Laws +.52 84 +.51 84 +.51 77 Positive 
 Benefit Generosity Index +.17 18 +.14 18 +.17 18 Positive 
 Relative Poverty Rate -.47 30 -.39 30 -.33 30 Positive 
 Human Development Index +.71 175 +.73 175 +.70 100 Positive 
Subjective Feel Goodness        
 Happiness +.41 77 +.44 77 +.45 70 Positive 
 Life Satisfaction +.65 78 +.66 78 +.66 71 Positive 
 The Good Society Index +.83 71 +.84 71 +.83 64 Positive 
  
      
1Less inequality and 
1less unemployment 
 
Comments: The three QoG variables are highly inter-correlated (about .90). Their separate effects on the 
outcome variables are always the same. The effects column indicates whether the QoG variables are positively or 
negatively related to a “good” outcome in the societal variables. n= number of countries. The Good Society Index 
includes measures of life expectancy, infant mortality and life satisfaction and is presented in Holmberg (2007). 
 
 
Table 3 
Effects of QoG (Government Effectiveness) on some twenty Societal Outcomes (regression coefficients) 
 
Societal Outcome Variables b p Unit for the dependent variable 
Effect of QoG: 
Government 
Effectiveness 
      
Health outcomes     
 Subjective health 0.12 0.003 1 – 5; Very poor – Very good Positive 
 Life Expectancy at Birth 7.82 0.000 Years Positive 
 Infant Mortality Rate -27.6 0.000 Deaths per 1,000 live births Positive 
 Mortality Rate Children <5 years -41.4 0.000 Deaths per 1,000 live births Positive 
 Prevalence of HIV -0.98 0.044 Percent of population aged 15-49 Positive 
Ecological Outcomes     
 Environmental Sustainability Index 4.3 0.000 Composite index (29.2 – 75.1)1 Positive 
 Air Quality 0.20 0.000 Composite index (-1.6 – 2.17) 1 Positive 
 Water Quality 0.30 0.000 Composite index (-1.93 – 1.64) 1 Positive 
 Improved Drinking Water Source 11.3 0.000 Percentage of population with access Positive 
 Carbon Emissions 3.44 0.000 Tons of carbon per capita Negative 
 Forest Cover Change 0.56 0.000 % (average annual rate of change)  Positive 
Economic Outcomes     
 GDP per Capita 7.8 0.000 1,000 I$ in 1996 constant prices Positive 
 GDP Growth 0.47 0.511 % (real GDP per capita) Not significant 
 Gini Index -4.7 0.000 Index (theoretically 0-100) Positive2 
 Unemployment -2.8 0.011 % of civilian labor force Positive2 
Societal Outcomes/Outputs     
 Social Security Laws 0.12 0.000 Composite index (0 – 0.87) 1 Positive 
 Benefit Generosity Index 2.8 0.556 Composite index (18.6 – 41.7) 1 Not significant 
 Relative Poverty Rate -2.3 0.032 % of population below 50% of median income Positive 
 Human Development Index 0.13 0.000 Composite index (theoretically 0 – 1) Positive 
Subjective Feel Goodness     
 Happiness 0.12 0.000 1 – 4; Not at all happy – Very happy Positive 
 Life Satisfaction 0.74 0.000 1 – 10; Dissatisfied – Satisfied Positive 
 The Good Society Index 14.9 0.000 Composite index (theoretically 1 – 71) Positive 
 
1Minimum and maximum value in the QoG data set. 
2Less inequality and less unemployment. 
 
Comments: The QoG variable (government effectiveness) is defined as the independent factor in a series of 
regression analyses with some twenty societal outcome variables as dependent factors. The source for the 
government effectiveness variable is the World Bank. Higher effectiveness scores signify more effective government. 
The Effect of QoG column indicates whether government effectiveness is positively or negatively related to a “good” 
outcome in the societal outcome variables (see also table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Life Expectancy at Birth vs. Government Effectiveness 
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R2=0.38 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank Governance Indicators 2002 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Water Quality vs. Government Effectiveness 
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R2=0.22 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, Esty et al 2005, (the Water Quality data pertains to the years 1994-2003), World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2002.  
 
Figure 3 
Carbon Emissions vs. Government Effectiveness 
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R2=0.23 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, Esty et al 2005, (the Carbon Emissions data pertains to the year 2001), World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2002 
 
 
Figure 4 
GDP per Capita vs. Government Effectiveness 
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R2=0.76 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, Heston et al 2002, (the GDP per Capita data pertains to the year 2000), World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2002 
 
Figure 5 
GDP Growth vs. Government Effectiveness 
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R2=0.00 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, Heston et al 2002, (the GDP Growth data pertains to the year 2000), World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2002 
 
 
Figure 6 
Relative Poverty Rate vs. Government Effectiveness 
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R2=0.15 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, Luxembourg Income Study 1996-2004, World Bank Governance Indicators 2002 
Percentage of population earning less than 50% of the median income. Mostly OECD countries. 
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Figure 7 
 
R2=0.71 
Source: The QoG Data Bank, Holmberg 2007, World Bank Governance Indicators 2002 
 
